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Summary 
The EU is a formidable trade power. While trade liberalization internally and externally 
have always been the essence of European integration, successive enlargements and the 
creation of the European Single Market have turned the EU into the world’s largest trade 
power. The EU is responsible for making trade policy through a complex decision-
making process that has often been contested politically but allows it to speak on behalf 
of its members in international trade negotiations. This chapter argues that not only does 
the EU derive some inherent power from trade, but that it is also increasingly prone to 
use trade as the backbone of its normative power. As a result the EU is now becoming a 
world power through trade, as one of the major actors shaping the multilateral trade 
agenda, and using access to its market strategically in order to obtain political 
concessions from its commercial partners. This chapter explores the determinants of the 
EU’s trade power (both inherent and normative) and examines the contribution of trade 
policy to the power of Europe in the international system, both in the context of the 
World Trade Organization and in the broader framework of international relations.    3
 
Introduction 
If there is any area in which the European Union (EU) has become an uncontested 
power in the international system, it is clearly in the field of trade policy. No wonder: 
trade is the EU’s raison d’être. The objective of the 1957 Treaty of Rome was to create a 
customs union between the original six members of the European Community in which 
there would be no barriers to trade and a common external tariff would be applied to 
imports from third countries. From its very beginning, then, the Community became a 
single actor in international trade policy and almost immediately started talking on an 
equal footing with the United States in commercial negotiations. With its successive 
enlargements from six to twenty-five countries and the prosperous economies of its 
member states, the EU has become a formidable trade power and interlocutor in 
international trade negotiations. 
Partly by design, partly by necessity, the EU entertains a very different 
relationship to power than the United States. It sees itself above all as a civilian and a 
normative, power, apt at using non-military tools to achieve its goals in the rest of the 
world (Duchêne, 1973; Hill, 1992; Stavridis, 2001; Nicolaidis and Howse, 2002; 
Manners, 2002). Trade is at the very core of the EU’s civilian power. The sheer size of 
the European single market, which attracts the outside world both for the possibilities it 
offers and for the fear of being excluded, is an essential element of EU power. The 
collective character of European trade policy has enabled the EU to become a true rival to   4
the United States. Yet the power of the EU in trade goes further that its impressive 
capacity to defend its own interests in international commercial negotiations. It also lies 
in its capacity to expand its own regulatory practices to the rest of the world and to use 
trade to promote internationally its own values and policies. In that the EU constitutes 
neither a rival to the US nor necessarily an ally, but it can be viewed as an “alternative” 
for countries seeking a power anchor when disagreeing with the US. The principled 
positions taken by the EU in the beef hormones and the ongoing Genetically Modified 
Organisms disputes are evidence of this new European propensity to seek to shape the 
global rules of the game according to its own internal compromises. 
In keeping with the driving themes of this volume, the present chapter explores 
the determinants of the EU’s trade power and examines the contribution of trade policy to 
the power of Europe in the international system, both in the context of the World Trade 
Organization and in the broader framework of international relations. In doing so we 
argue that it is crucial to distinguish between the inherent power derived from trade and 
the use of trade as the backbone of normative power. We start by recounting how the EU 
acquired and retained competence to represent the member states in trade policy, from the 
Treaty of Rome to the latest debate around a new European Constitution. Section 2 
provides an overview of the EU trade policy-making process, while Section 3 explores 
how its recent enlargement may transform the trade power of the EU. Section 4 moves on 
to asking whether and how, on this institutional basis, the EU can credibly be presented 
as a champion of multilateralism, including in the context of dispute resolution in the 
WTO. We conclude by assessing the EU as a world power in trade and through trade. 
   5
The Road to European Competence in Trade   
The common commercial policy is the most prominent EU policy to have been under 
supranational competence from the very beginning. Whether in bilateral, regional or 
multilateral trade negotiations, Europe formally “speaks with one voice” and negotiates 
through one agent, the European Commission. The very idea that nation-states could give 
up such a key area of their external affairs was, and continues to be, revolutionary. But 
the granting of competence over trade to the supranational authority has not always been 
without political controversy (Meunier and Nicolaidis 1999). While the expansion of the 
global trade agenda during the 1990s, notably to services, seemed to call for a parallel 
expansion of the scope of EU competence, several member states resisted further 
transfers of sovereignty, leading to a protracted battle over the issue of trade competence. 
This section explores the conflicts within the EU over the appropriate institutional design 
for trade policy-making as reflected in the balance between competences exclusive to the 
EU and those shared with the member states. 
 
The Common Commercial Policy in the Treaty of Rome 
As the nascent European Community’s raison d’être, trade policy immediately came 
under supranational competence. In the field of trade, the Treaty of Rome was a 
revolutionary document. Not only did it contain unusually broad injunctions for 
achieving free trade internally, it also granted the new supranational entity an external 
personality with the authority to elaborate, negotiate and enforce all aspects of trade   6
relations with the rest of the world.1 In practice, this was done through the establishment 
of a common commercial policy based on three principles: a common external tariff, 
common trade agreements with third countries, and the uniform application of trade 
instruments across member states.  
Until the 1997 Amsterdam Summit, the Treaty of Rome’s original wording of 
Article 113,2 which grants the Community exclusive competence in “trade” policy 
(without defining the term), remained almost unchanged (Devuyst 1992; Maresceau 
1993). The provisions determining the trade policy-making process delegated authority 
from the individual states and their parliaments to the assembly of European states, acting 
collectively through the Council of Ministers. This approach can be understood in 
classical principal-agent terms: the member states (principals) have delegated their 
authority to conclude trade agreements to the European Community (agent), acting on 
their behalf. This contrasts with areas of “mixed” competence (such as the negotiation of 
association agreements), where formal authority remains with the individual member 
states, in particular through parliamentary ratification. In both cases, the member states 
represent the ultimate authority, but in the former it is as voting parties in the EU 
structures, while in the latter it is through their sovereign parliament. The conduct of 
trade policy in practice reveals a second level of delegation, this time from the Council of 
Ministers (principals) to the European Commission (agent), which initiates the 
participation of the EU in international trade negotiations and negotiates on behalf of the 
member states.  
                                                 
1The 1952 European Coal and Steel Community did not have external powers.  
2 Article 113 was renamed Article 133 at Amsterdam.   7
The challenge to exclusive competence during the 1990s 
During the two decades following the Treaty of Rome, the Commission successfully 
negotiated on behalf of its members two major trade rounds under GATT, as well as a 
host of bilateral trade agreements. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, however, several 
developments challenged the clear foundations of the Community’s trade competence.  
The first of these challenges was the emergence of so-called “new issues” (above 
all services) onto the international trade agenda in the mid-1980s. Issues such as aviation 
and product standards had been discussed already at the close of the Tokyo Round in 
1979, but most member states considered these too domestically sensitive to leave 
entirely to the Commission.3 The subsequent expansion of the world trade agenda onto 
policies traditionally not “at the border” (e.g. tariffs and quotas) but “inside the state” 
(e.g. national laws and regulations) forced an explicit internal EU debate on the issue of 
competence. Several member states, reluctant to give up forever entire new sectors of 
their trade policy, insisted on being granted their own competences with respect to the 
“new issues”, arguing that these were not covered under the original Treaty of Rome. 
Another challenge was the creation of the new World Trade Organization (WTO), 
with a broader trade agenda than GATT, which forced the issue of trade authority to the 
fore (Devuyst 1995). The question of membership constituted an unavoidable legal 
challenge for the European Community, even though the rest of the world left it up to the 
Europeans to decide how this would be settled. The EC had never formally substituted 
                                                 
3 At that point, they found a compromise solution whereby the Community concluded all the agreements of 
the Round, while the ECSC Tariff Protocol, the Standards Code and the Civil Aircraft Code were 
concluded jointly by the Community and the Member States (Kuilwijk, 1996).   8
the member states in GATT, whose creation preceded that of the Community. Since the 
GATT was only an “agreement” with signatories but no members, the question of 
Community membership never formally arose. For all practical purposes, therefore, the 
EC --represented by the Commission-- had been accepted by the other GATT partners as 
one of them. Moreover, formally replacing the member states by the EC could have a 
cost, since the individual voting rights of member states in GATT would give way to a 
single vote.4 
In order to solve the competence dispute, the Commission asked the European 
Court of Justice for an “advisory opinion” on the issue of competence. If member states 
were not going to compromise politically, perhaps their objection could be overruled 
legally. In November 1994, the European judges confirmed that the Community had sole 
competence to conclude international agreements on trade in goods.5 In a controversial 
move, however, they also held that the member states and the Community shared 
competence in dealing with trade in the “new issues”.6 As we have argued elsewhere, the 
Court in effect had sent the ball back to the politicians (Meunier and Nicolaidis 1999; 
Nicolaidis and Meunier 2002). To avoid future competence disputes, they would have to 
amend the treaty either by following the Court’s opinion and enshrine this new sharing of 
                                                 
4Since GATT operated by consensus, this had more symbolic than practical significance. 
5Including agricultural products and products covered by the European Coal and Steel Community and 
Euratom treaties. 
6Court of Justice of the European Communities, Opinion 1/94, 15 November 1994, I-123.  
  (1) The Community has sole competence, pursuant to Article 113 of the EC Treaty, to conclude 
the multilateral agreements on trade in goods. 
  (2) The Community and its Member States are jointly competent to conclude GATS. 
  (3) The Community and its Member States are jointly competent to conclude TRIPs.   9
sovereignty in the texts or by explicitly “expanding” Community trade competence to 
include new issues. 
From Amsterdam to Nice: A political solution to the competence dispute 
The resolution of the competence dispute and the revision of Article 113 were tacked 
onto the broad agenda of the 1996 Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC), which was 
expected to design an institutional reform that would enable the Union to function with 
25 members in the next millennium. Yet the member states could not agree to put the 
competence issue in trade to rest. The IGC culminated with the signing of the Amsterdam 
Treaty, in which the member states eventually agreed to a simple and short amendment to 
Article 113 (renumbered 133) allowing for future expansion of exclusive competence to 
the excluded sectors through a unanimous vote of the Council.7 In trade policy, the 
Amsterdam outcome was a statement that extension of Community competence should 
be the result of case-by-case political decisions rather than some uncontrollable spillover. 
In effect, this decision amounted to a European equivalent of the US’s fast track 
procedures, whereby Congress grants trade negotiating authority to the White House and 
USTR each time a new round of international negotiations is in sight.  
Not surprisingly, it quickly became clear that the Amsterdam compromise on 
trade was not sustainable. Member states felt compelled to review the trade competence 
issue once more at Nice in December 2000, so soon after the hardly-fought battle in 
Amsterdam, for three main reasons. First was the significant increase in trade in services 
                                                 
7 The new Article 113 (5) as finally adopted reads as follows: “The Council, acting unanimously on a 
proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may extend the application of   10
which had taken place since 1997.  In order to capitalize on such growth, Commission 
trade officials, under the helm of Frenchman Pascal Lamy since September 1999, insisted 
that trade in services be transferred under the exclusive competence of the Community 
for reasons of efficiency, especially in view of the upcoming “Millenium round” of 
multilateral trade negotiations expected to be launched in Seattle in November 2003.  
Second, trade had suddenly become a hot political issue, as globalization gave rise 
to a new brand of well-organized activists worldwide. The defeat of the OECD-based 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment in 1998 -which aimed to facilitate international 
investment by ensuring that host governments treat foreign and domestic firms- similarly, 
was interpreted by anti-globalization activists as a victory against a text that would have 
limited the ability of national governments to regulate the protection of their culture, 
environment, natural resources and health, as well as ended the protection of their 
citizens from foreign investors. Trade was again highly politicized in the summer 1999 
when French sheep farmer José Bové and his companions very publicly destroyed a 
McDonald’s in the French countryside in response to the retaliatory trade sanctions that 
the WTO had authorize the United States to take against the EU in the beef hormones and 
bananas cases (Meunier 2000a). This politicization of trade reached its peak in December 
1999 when the international trade talks in Seattle supposed to launch a new round of 
multilateral trade talks collapsed, amidst massive public demonstrations by anti-
globalization protesters. All of these episodes were reflections and further contributing 
factors to the increasingly contentious character of trade.8 Specifically, anti-globalization 
                                                                                                                                                 
paragraph 1 to 4 to international negotiations and agreements on services and intellectual property insofar 
as they are not covered by these paragraphs.”  
8 Meunier 2000b.   11
activists focused their attention on issues such as trade in cultural, education and social 
services –issues that had been left open to further transfer of competence by the 
Amsterdam compromise.  
Third, the prospect of imminent enlargement of the EU also contributed to calls 
for revisiting the trade competence issue. Widening membership of the EU to many more 
countries, all with disparate and even contradictory interests, lent a double sense of 
urgency to the issue.  On the one hand, and most obviously, external representation --like 
other policy areas-- risked increased inefficiency at best, stalemate at worse. An 
arrangement originally designed for six members would likely no longer be adequate 
when the “single voice” has to represent twenty-five different countries. On the other 
hand, the current members may have had an interest in “locking in” their preferred 
institutional design before the widening to new members. The prospect of new entrants 
eager to use their veto power to block trade liberalization in some sectors or, on the 
contrary, eager to favor liberalization in other areas where existing members would prefer 
protection may have proven enough of an incentive for the existing members of the EU to 
settle the institutional question in Nice. 
The final agreement reflected the bargaining dynamics of the negotiation.  There 
was a general momentum at Nice to expand qualified majority voting, and article 133 
was to be no exception. Exclusive competence became the general rule for trade in 
services (133.5). Exceptions to exclusive competence in order to satisfy residual national 
sensitivities were kept to a minimum and carved out under a ‘positive list’ approach.  
First and foremost, the Treaty enshrined the concept of “mixed competence” developed 
by the Court in its 1994 jurisprudence as a new legal category. Particularly noteworthy is   12
the explicit inclusion of the “cultural exception” clause in Community law, with cultural 
and audiovisual services falling under mixed competence alongside education, social and 
human health services. In addition, transport remained under a separate legal basis (title 
V and article 300). Finally, intellectual property was divided in two components: 
“commercial aspects of intellectual property”, which fall under exclusive competence, 
and all other aspects of intellectual property, which are shared. But the Council could 
decide by unanimity that the provisions relevant to exclusive competence can be 
extended to the latter –a last echo of the defunct Amsterdam compromise.9 In EU 
parlance, the “passerelle clause” had now been circumscribed to one last, sensitive, area 
of trade negotiations.  
This outcome proved quite satisfactory for most member states: for France 
(adamant about cultural exception); for Great Britain (which cared more about the 
linkage with taxation); for Germany (who is happy about the result for air transport, and 
whose Länder are content with shared competence on culture); and for the pro-integration 
countries who can claim that the original spirit of the Treaty of Rome has been, at least to 
some extent, restored. 
                                                 
9 Article 133, para. 6: “An agreement may not be concluded by the Council if it includes provisions which 
would go beyond the Community’s internal powers, in particular by leading to harmonization of the laws or 
regulations of the Member States in an area for which this Treaty rules out such harmonization. 
In this regard, by way of derogation from the first subparagraph of paragraph 5, agreements relating to 
trade in cultural and audiovisual services, educational services, and social and human health services, shall 
fall within the shared competence of the Community and its member states. Consequently, in addition to a 
Community decision taken in accordance with the relevant provisions of Article 300, the negotiation of 
such agreements shall require the common accord of the Member States. 
The negotiation and conclusion of international agreements in the field of transport shall continue to be 
governed by the provisions of Title V and Article 300.”   13
Trade policy in the EU Constitution 
The debate over competence and representation in trade policy was not closed with the 
Nice Treaty. When a European Convention on the Future of Europe was convened in the 
Spring of 2002 to draft a constitution for Europe, many voices demanded a greater role 
for the European Parliament in trade. Indeed, these demands have increased as the reach 
of trade policy increased to politically sensitive issues that used to be the exclusive 
domain of domestic regulation, such as food safety and culture. A group of EU 
parliamentarians filed a constitutional amendment that would give the Parliament 
unprecedented powers in shaping EU trade policy, including the establishment of a right 
to a vote of assent in the Parliament for any significant bilateral and multilateral trade 
deals entered into by the EU. The Commission has also pushed for a greater role for the 
parliament in trade policy, on the implicit grounds that a right to veto by the Parliament 
could provide Commission officials with greater leverage in international trade 
negotiations.  
In response to these demands, the Convention introduced many important 
institutional changes with respect to trade policy –changes which were endorsed by the 
Intergovernmental Conference which followed and finally agreed on a draft Constitution 
in June 2004 (to be ratified by 2006). First, the draft Constitution opened up greater 
avenues for parliamentary control. Trade-related legislation, such as antidumping rules, 
will now be adopted according to the co-decision procedure –that is, jointly by the 
Council and the Parliament. The Commission is in charge of the implementation of these 
rules. The Parliament will be kept informed of the progress of trade negotiations and it 
will get to approve the conclusion of trade agreements. Formally, this will mean equal   14
power of the Council and the Parliament over trade policy. In practice of course, the 
involvement of the Council through the on-going oversight of Commission activities (see 
below) still leaves the former in a stronger position.  
The second institutional problem faced by the EU has been the challenge of 
keeping an efficient decision-making system in an enlarged Europe of 25 or even 30 
member states. As we have seen, the rule of Qualified Majority Voting did not apply to 
all cases of trade policy which meant that the existence of a veto could lead to a paralysis 
of the system. The draft Constitution which goes further than the 2000 Nice Treaty 
simplifies the trade policy-making apparatus by establishing that trade policy is an 
exclusive Community competence, whether in goods, services, intellectual property and 
foreign direct investment. The use of qualified majority voting is broadened 
correspondingly. There remains however, one exception to this radical symplifaction: l’ 
exception culturelle. Unsurprisingly, all French representatives at the Convention  were 
adamant that matters of trade in cultural and audiovisual services constituted the critical 
French “red line” and were even supported by a majority of member states, including 
Germany and Poland. The text actually states that the Council uses unanimity for the 
negotiation and conclusion of agreements in trade in cultural and audiovisual services 
when such agreements could jeopardize the cultural and linguistic diversity of the EU. In 
other cases, majority voting will apply.  
If adopted, these institutional changes would make the EU function more 
effectively across the board. Its trade policy regime more similar to that of the US, where 
the Congress has the authority to grant negotiating authority to the president and to veto 
multilateral and bilateral trade deals. Perhaps most importantly, the deal embedded in the   15
Constitution would appear to represent a relatively stable equilibrium after a decade of 
haggling over the precise delineation of powers between the EU and the member states. 
 
The EU trade policy-making process 
How does the EU make decisions in an area which, for all relevant purposes, falls under 
its prerogative of exclusive competence? The key to this question is to understand the 
relationship between the Commission and the member states, which can be stylized as a 
principal-agent relation (Nicolaidis, 2000). We outline below the precise steps and 
specify the actors involved during each of these steps.  
We first need to distinguish between four stages in the negotiation of international 
agreements: (1) the design of a negotiation mandate; (2) the representation of the parties 
during the negotiations; (3) the ratification of the agreement once negotiated; and (4) the 
implementation and enforcement of the agreement once it is brought into force. Figure 1 
compares the procedures and the actors in charge at each of these stages in cases of 
“exclusive” and “mixed” competence.10   Whether the Community is perceived to speak 
with “one voice” is most relevant during the negotiations but is also affected by shared 
expectations about the ratification stage. 
In theory, the core difference between exclusive and mixed competence comes at 
the ratification stage. Mixed competence in trade simply means that delegation of 
authority on the part of the member states is granted on an ad-hoc basis for negotiation   16
purposes rather than systematically. Individual member states retain a veto both through 
unanimity voting in the Council and through ratification by their own national 
parliament. In practice, the difference is more blurred. On one hand, exclusive 
competence does not guarantee a single voice:  Member states might fail to find a 
majority behind a given policy and if so, their external front may crumble. More to the 
point, powerful member states still exercise an informal veto both at the mandate and the 
ratification stages, to the extent that the Luxembourg compromise extends to the trade 
area.  Conversely, member states have managed to speak with one voice in areas of 
mixed competence or common foreign policy (as exemplified by 95% of the decisions 
taken in common in the United Nations).  The principle of unity of representation through 
the Commission is valid under both configurations, even while in both cases, individual 
member states usually seek to reduce Commission autonomy to the extent tolerated by 
their partners. Nevertheless, the expression of dissent is dampened, the incentives for 
seeking compromise increased and the role of the Commission enhanced in areas of 
exclusive competence. 
The negotiating mandate  
The European Commission has the power to propose legislation, act as the guardian of 
EU treaties, and ensure that EU legislation is implemented by all members. The 
Commission’s role in the EU institutional edifice is to act in support of the collective 
goals and needs, independently of instructions from national governments. Therefore it is 
up to the Commission to elaborate proposals for the initiation and content of international 
                                                                                                                                                 
10We leave out the enforcement stage, which is of lesser importance to our discussion.   17
trade negotiations (Johnson 1998; Meunier and Nicolaidis 1999; Woolcock 2000; 
Meunier 2005). The initial proposals are made by staffers in the Trade Directorate (“DG 
Trade”), based like the rest of the Commission in Brussels. DG Trade assists, and 
answers to, the EU Trade Commissioner, nominated by the Member States along with the 
nineteen other commissioners for a five-year term (between 1999 and 2004, the EU Trade 
Commissioner was Frenchman Pascal Lamy).  
Once DG Trade has elaborated proposals for trade negotiations, the key policy 
discussions take place in a special advisory committee, the "Committee 133,” named 
after Article 133 on trade policy.11 It plays a key role in helping member states influence 
EU trade policy, even though its role is formally consultative only.12 The agenda of the 
Committee 133 is set by the Commission, in collaboration with the rotating presidency of 
the EU. The Committee 133 meets weekly at either the senior level or at the level of 
deputies. The senior members (“titulaires”), senior civil servants from the member states’ 
national ministries as well as the director general of DG Trade, meet once a month in 
Brussels. In addition they meet in Geneva whenever there are WTO plenary sessions. 
These senior members serve on the committee for extended periods of time and have a 
good sense of what actions are politically acceptable within their state of origin. They 
only deal with the politically sensitive problems. The Committee 133 also meets three 
Fridays a month at the level of deputies, who are drawn from the member states’ 
permanent representations in Brussels, sometimes from the national ministries, in 
addition to the director of the WTO unit within DG Trade and special experts. The 
                                                 
11 The "Committee 133" is named after Article 133 §3. 
12 See Raymond J. Ahearn, 2002.   18
deputies deal with the more technical issues. Additionally, there are also subcommittees 
of a sectoral nature (such as “133 textiles”, “133 services”, “133 steel”), which prepare 
the work for the Committee 133. Matters are typically discussed until a consensus 
emerges and no formal votes are recorded.13  
The Commission almost always follows the advice of the Committee 133, since 
its members reflect the wishes of the ministers who ultimately can refuse to conclude the 
agreement negotiated by the Commission.14 Once the Committee has amended 
Commission proposals, they are transmitted to the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (COREPER) –a key group based in Brussels and composed of the 
member state officials who are national ambassadors to the EU, their deputies and staff. 
COREPER then transmits the negotiating proposal to the Council of Ministers, which has 
the power to establish objectives for trade negotiations (known as the “negotiating 
mandate”). Composed of ministers from each government, the Council represents the 
national interests of the member states. The composition of the Council varies, depending 
on the subject matter under discussion. With respect to trade policy, the issues are often 
tackled by the Council on Foreign Ministers, although sometimes it is composed 
exclusively of trade ministers.  
The Council then agrees on a negotiating mandate to hand out the Commission. 
The form of the actual mandate   varies depending on the negotiation: in some cases the 
mandate takes the form of one or several directives, while in other cases the mandate is 
                                                 
13 The deliberations of the Committee 133 are not published, which is a complaint often raised by anti-
globalization groups like ATTAC. But with 26 delegations around the table, secrecy can only go so far… 
14  See Fiona Hayes-Renshaw and Helen Wallace, 1997, p. 88.   19
only a very vague document.15 ”Negotiating directives” are not legally constraining: the 
negotiator can depart from those directives, but then takes the risk of having to sell the 
negotiating package to the Council at the end of the negotiation. Court jurisprudence and 
treaty articles spell out the cases in which policy decisions are made according to 
majority or unanimity. According to the 1957 Treaty of Rome, unanimity should have 
been used for external trade only until January 1966, end of the transitional period. 
Majority voting would have been automatically instituted after this date, had France's De 
Gaulle not paralyzed the functioning of Community institutions with the "empty chair" 
crisis during the Kennedy Round. The crisis resulted in the "Luxembourg Compromise," 
a gentleman's agreement according to which an individual member state could veto a 
decision otherwise taken according to qualified majority if it deemed that vital national 
interests were at stake.16 The subsequent addition of new member states increased the 
divergence of interests within the EC and rendered even more difficult the task of 
reaching a common bargaining position for international trade negotiations. The 1985 
Single European Act attempted to establish the primacy of majority voting. With the 
exception of sensitive areas such as taxes, employee rights, and the free movement of 
persons, the member states agreed to use majority voting to legislate on all economic 
matters.17 Since then, at least on paper, the Council agrees on a common external 
bargaining position for international trade negotiations on “traditional” trade issues 
(exclusive of services and intellectual property) according to a “qualified majority” 
                                                 
15 On the formal vs. informal shapes of the negotiating mandate in trade policy, see Kerremans 2003. 
16See Garrett 1995 on the Luxembourg Compromise and the various legislative procedures today. See 
Chapter 3 of this book for an analysis of the historical relation between the Luxembourg Compromise and 
the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations.   20
system. This is a procedure under which member states are assigned different voting 
weights, based approximately on the size of their population, and by which roughly two-
thirds of the votes are needed in order for a proposal to be accepted.18 Nevertheless, in 
reaching a common bargaining position for international trade negotiations as in reaching 
most other policy decisions in the Community, member states have most often attempted 
to find a general consensus around a given issue without resorting to a formal vote.19.  
The competence over external trade negotiations is therefore fairly centralized at 
the Commission and Council levels. Unlike in other fields of external agreements, such 
as the association agreements, the European Parliament has no formal say in the process. 
Subsequent Treaty modifications, such as the 1986 Single European Act, the 1991 
Maastricht Treaty, the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty and the 2000 Nice Treaty have not 
increased the role of the Parliament in the trade policy-making process. In practice, 
                                                                                                                                                 
17See Moravcsik 1991 on the issue of voting in the Single European Act. 
18From 1995 to 2003, Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom each had 10 votes; Spain 8; 
Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal 5; Austria and Sweden 4; Ireland, Denmark and Finland 3; 
and Luxembourg 2. 62 votes out of a total of 87 votes needed to be cast in its favor for a Commission 
proposal to be adopted. In other cases, the qualified majority remained the same but the 62 votes had to be 
cast by at least 10 member states. The qualified majority requirements were changed by the 2004 Accession 
Treaty. A qualified majority will be obtained if the decision receives at least a specified number of votes 
and the decision is approved by a majority of Member States. The weighing of the votes was also changed. 
See for instance http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/igc2000/dialogue/info/offdoc/guidecitoyen_en.pdf for a 
table of the new voting weights, including those of the candidate countries.   
19 In 1994 only 14% of the legislation adopted by the Council was formally put to a vote and subject of 
negative votes and abstentions (source: Guide to EU institutions, The Council, EUROPA web server). 
Moreover, while in theory the consultation procedure (under which Commission proposals can be amended 
by the Council only unanimously) applies, in practice the Commission alters its proposal several times 
following the deliberations of the 133 Committee in order to ensure adoption by the Council (Garrett and 
Tsebelis 1998 argue that the consultation procedure gives the agenda-setting Commission the possibility to 
act strategically in presenting its proposals to the Council). Even during the height of the crisis created by 
French demands for a renegotiation of the Uruguay Round agricultural agreement between the EU and the 
US in 1993, member states insisted that the tradition of consensus be not broken. See also Devuyst 1995; 
Paemen and Bensch 1995; and Woolcock and Hodges 1996 on the EC negotiating process during the 
Uruguay Round.   21
informal procedures exist for informing and consulting the Parliament: the Commission 
and the Council inform the Parliament of the conduct of international trade negotiations 
on an informal basis and may request the Parliament’s approval before the formal 
ratification of an international agreement. Nevertheless, while it cannot veto trade 
legislation (unlike legislation in social policy, agriculture, and the internal market), the 
Parliament can hold hearings and issue reports on trade issues, thereby influencing 
indirectly the course of trade negotiations. Lately it has tried to exert greater clout over 
trade, especially those issues with a heavy regulatory component that have divided the 
EU and the US.20 The European Parliament was indeed the driving force behind the EU 
ban on aircraft engine hushkits to meet noise standards, data protection issues that affect 
US firms, and broadcast and motion picture quotas. Perhaps this will marginally change 
if the EU Constitution is adopted.  
 
The negotiations 
 
Following the adoption of the negotiating mandate by the Council, the actual conduct of 
international trade negotiations for the EU is carried out by members of the Commission, 
acting under the authority of the Trade Commissioner. The situation during the 
negotiations may seem somewhat surrealistic: member states are allowed to observe but 
not speak in WTO plenary sessions.  In principle, as long as they remain within the limits 
set by the mandate, Commission negotiators are free to conduct bargaining with third 
countries as they wish. In practice the negotiators’ latitude and flexibility vary case by 
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case, depending on the member states’ willingness to give up control over the issue being 
negotiated. While they remain silent in plenary, member states ambassadors usually do 
not shy away from informal corridor negotiations with EU counterparts. Moreover, the 
Committee 133 often meets in Geneva during the negotiations to ascertain whether the 
Commission remains with its mandate and to agree on changes in negotiating position. 
Thus if the EU Commissioner is envisaging a significant move, he needs to either call the 
capitals or call a meeting on the premise of the negotiations. This oversight often makes 
moves and concessions harder for the EU than for other trade partners, but it also gives it 
significant bargaining power (Meunier 2000b; Meunier 2005). From the member states’ 
viewpoint, it is this oversight that makes it acceptable to issue vague mandates containing 
little indication of the actual positions to be taken in negotiation. 
 
The ratification 
At the conclusion of the negotiations, the trade agreement must be ratified. In cases of 
agreements falling entirely under EU competence (such as on textiles and steel), the 
Council approves or rejects the final text according to qualified majority voting –with the 
exception of some services and intellectual property negotiations where unanimity is the 
rule (Meunier 2005). In most cases, however, the ratification process is complicated by 
the “mixed” nature of many of the big, “packaged” trade agreements, which must be 
approved both by the EU as a whole and by the individual Member States. EU ratification 
occurs through adoption in the Council. As for Member States, they ratify the trade 
agreement according to their own internal procedures, such as a vote in parliament. In 
practice, the Council always decides on the temporary implementation of the EU-only   23
part of the agreement. The rest, subject to national ratification, is implemented later, often 
years. Hence, there is no room for big surprises at the ratification stage of the negotiation, 
since Member States have had ample time to manifest their reservations during the course 
of the international negotiations. 
The enlarged EU as a trade power 
The EU enlarged to ten new countries in May 2004, the biggest enlargement ever since 
its creation. This did not trigger any immediate disruption of trade, since the transition 
had been prepared for a decade. Indeed, on the eve of enlargement, over 95% of the trade 
of the EU-15 with the new entrants was already free. 
Structurally, enlargement will make the EU stronger in relation to its trade 
negotiating partners, because a larger single market is both a more attractive prize to 
outside economic players and a more costly opportunity loss in cases when a threat of 
being cut out is carried through. Enlargement increases the size of the single market 
(accounting for 18% of world trade and contributing to 25% of the world’s GDP), 
augments the geographical size of the EU by 34%, and boosts the total population by 105 
million to a total of $450 million.21  
By joining the EU, however, the new entrants are bringing in a wealth of different 
histories and cultures, which also means different interests, priorities and sensibilities. 
These will have to be included and amalgamated in the definition of a common European 
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position on trade, thus posing a challenge to the current institutional mechanisms. 
Pessimists argue that diversity could incapacitate the EU and bog down multilateral trade 
liberalization. Substantively, they say it could also lead to common positions which are 
invariably the lowest common denominator and, therefore, to a protectionist bias of the 
EU in international trade negotiations. On the other hand, there is no doubt that through 
sheer arithmetics, enlargement will make internal EU negotiations more difficult to 
control for trade ministers; it can be argued that this in turn could further concentrate 
trade policy-making power in the hands of the Commission, which has a historical and 
functionalist interest in promoting trade liberalization (Van den Hoven 2002). In short, 
the impact of the new members on the balance between protectionist and liberal forces in 
the EU overall is under-determined. 
Undoubtedly however, EU enlargement raises several legal and political issues. 
For instance, the US and the new entrants have bilateral agreements on investment 
protection that do include provisions contrary to Community law (for instance with 
respect to investments in the audiovisual sector). Another issue is the negotiation which 
necessarily follows from the extension of the customs union to ten currently autonomous 
territories (known as Article 24 negotiation). In most cases, third countries will benefit 
from a drop in custom duties. Official EU calculations predict that enlargement will lead, 
overall, to a reduction in average tariffs from 9 to 4%.22 In some highly visible cases, 
however, the pre-enlargement custom duties of the new entrants are lower (when not 
null) than those of the EU – leading to a raise after May 2004 and thus presumably trade 
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frictions, in particular with the United States (similar to the “chicken war” of 1963). 
Independent calculations show that enlargement will indeed lower industrial tariffs in the 
new entrants, but it may nearly double tariffs on agriculture, especially for products such 
as wheat, beef, and dairy products, which are all important in the EU trade policy at the 
WTO (Van den Hoven 2002). 
From a political perspective, one could expect the new entrants to pursue a 
general policy line more favorable to the United States, as was suggested by Secretary 
Rumsfeld’s quip on “old Europe, new Europe” at the time of the Iraq war: it would seem 
that “new Europe” is more open to the US economically as well as politically. But while 
the US administration can certainly be expected to pursue its strategy of “divide and 
rule”, the extension of qualified majority voting should limit the incidences when such 
tactics can work since it is getting harder to muster a blocking minority. On some issues, 
however, the new entrants will likely have trade interests contrary to those of the US. 
Analysts expect Poland and several other new entrants to become strong supporters of 
anti-dumping measures for basic industrial goods such as steel, chemicals and textiles 
(Messerlin 2001; Van den Hoven 2002; Evenett and Verlmust 2004). Moreover, the 
countries that stand to benefit most from the generous EU agricultural provisions will not 
be inclined to make concessions on that issue. Once they gain access to CAP subsidies, 
they may likely strengthen the protectionist camp in the agricultural sector. Finally, since 
the services sector is still relatively weak in these countries, this may weaken internal EU 
support for greater services liberalization in the WTO (Van den Hoven 2002). 
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The EU as champion of multilateralism? 
We have now illustrated how almost all of trade policy falls under the exclusive net of the 
EU; how, under this configuration, the Commission negotiates on behalf and under the 
control of member states; and the potential impact of enlargement on those dynamics. 
How, then, does the EU exercise its formidable power in trade policy? We argue that it 
has been by asserting its central role in the multilateral system, less to uphold the value of 
multilateralism as a public good and more to promote the EU’s own interest in this 
system. The EU has always claimed that its single market is a building block for 
multilateralism and often posits itself as champion of international law, including in the 
field of global economic governance (by contrast to the United States, for instance). Yet, 
it does continue to attract criticism. Can it genuinely pretend to defend developing 
countries in view of the amount of subsidies poured into its protectionist agricultural 
policy? Is it nor the case that its highly differentiated approach to trade agreements 
around the world constitutes undue discrimination? Is the EU not trying to impose its 
own regulatory model as a condition for free trade instead of negotiating with world 
partners on an equal footing?   
The European single market and world trade liberalization 
From its inception, the EU has played a central role in multilateral trade negotiations 
(Woolcock 1993; Young 2000, 2002; Smith 2001; Meunier 2005). In the 1960s it 
introduced a new radical tariff-cutting formula which greatly reduced the transaction 
costs of negotiations. In spite of the rising trend of “new protectionism” in the 1970s, the 
Europeans led the way in attacking so called non-tariff barriers. As the EU accelerated   27
the pace of completion of its single market in the run-up to 1992, issues became more 
complicated. Quite logically, it required that firms wishing to export goods and services 
into the EU conform to its standards and regulations as well as to its conformity 
assessment procedures (Mattli and Buthe 2003). Since such requirements had not been 
consistently enforced before, the move initially spurred cries of “fortress Europe” – 
indeed the external dimension of the single market had been dealt with a bit as an 
afterthought. But quickly, the EU Commission sought to ensure that foreign firms be 
given a fair chance of access through opportunities to demonstrate their conformity to 
standards (Nicolaidis and Egan 2001).  
 
As the programme to complete the single market agreed to under the Single Act 
(1987-1992) coincided with the Uruguay Round (1986-1993), the EU progressively 
developed a strategy to export its approach to trade liberalization to the global level, 
especially in dealing with trade in services, the core new area in both settings (Drake and 
Nicolaidis 1992). Along with the US, it promoted the inclusion of “new issues” (services, 
intellectual property rights, and trade related investment measures) under the WTO which 
was created at the end of the Uruguay Round. Agriculture, however, has remained the 
glaring counter-example of liberalization. By the end of the Uruguay Round in 1993, the 
EU did not look so good as a trade liberalizer, as the trade distortions engendered by the 
CAP led the US to build a coalition of GATT members against the European agricultural   28
policy (Patterson 1997; Davis 2003). The Cairns group on its part mobilized against both 
US and EU farming support.23  
But the issue is not only how much liberalization, but also what kind of 
liberalization and for whose benefit. During the 1990s, the developing world 
progressively came to question the “grand bargain” agreed to during the Uruguay Round 
– namely, accepting to open up their markets to services and to enforce patents in 
exchange for greater access for their industrial products. The cost of the former turned 
out to be higher than many had foreseen while increased access for third world exports 
often failed to materialize. Initially both the US and the EU resisted their attempt to 
revisit this bargain while at the same time pushing for a continued expansion of the 
multilateral agenda to include issues such as linkage between trade access and labor and 
environment standards. The tension between OECD countries – including the EU – and 
the developing world culminated at Seattle in 1999. But in the years since, the EU has 
managed to establish, at least partly, a new reputation as a champion of multilateralism. 
Today it is the EU who is mobilizing WTO members against the perceived US 
unilateralism on issues such as steel, taxation, and anti-dumping. Most importantly, the 
EU played a key role in launching the “Doha development agenda”, in November 2001, 
the first trade round avowedly aimed specifically the welfare of the developing countries. 
There it promoted the adoption of a path-breaking declaration on trade and public health 
which opened the way for legalizing broad exemptions from intellectual property 
constraints by importing generic drugs to treat diseases like AIDS (a final agreement was 
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finally accepted by the US in August 2003). Moreover, the EU sought to take the lead in 
making good on market access by launching in the run-up to the Doha Round, the 
“Everything but Arms” initiative (EBA), designed to offer preferential market access to 
the exports of the 48 least developed countries in the world. This initiative enabled the 
EU to change its image in the WTO by holding the high moral ground, even though it 
was not able then to have its approach adopted by the entire WTO membership. 
Many voices, however, question the EU’s genuine commitment to putting 
multilateralism at the service of development. Agriculture has at last become central 
stage in the Doha round, with developed countries being asked to reduce (if not 
eliminate) their trade-distorting farm subsidies and drastically decrease their tariffs, 
quotas, and non-tariff barriers. While the EU and the US had reached a common proposal 
on reform of the protection of their agriculture, this was not enough. The collapse of the 
WTO Cancun meeting in September 2003 was due to a great extent to differences over 
agricultural reform, especially over the issue of cotton, between the US, the EU and a 
group of developing countries led by Brazil and India (called the G-22). Perhaps more 
fundamentally, the meeting exposed a clash between an EU philosophy of trade 
liberalisation based on the design and enforcement of new multilateral rules reproducing 
the EU’s own approach (the so-called “Singapore issues” --investment, competition 
policy, government procurement, and trade facilitation) and the approach of most of the 
rest of the world, which continues to view trade rounds as fora for the exchange of 
reciprocal conditions. The abrupt end of the Cancun meeting testifies to this tension and 
left a great deal of uncertainty on how to proceed next with talks on agriculture, industrial 
                                                                                                                                                 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay, the Philippines,   30
goods, and the Singapore issues when agreements need to be reached in a consensual way 
in an organization with 148 members.  
In what direction is EU trade policy evolving? In the Spring 2004, the EU made 
bold proposals in order to relaunch the multilateral trade talks. Most importantly, it 
offered to put on the table all agricultural export subsidies, provided that others do the 
same and that the final agreement offer an overall balanced package on agriculture. For 
decades the issue of agricultural export subsidies had been a sticking point in multilateral 
trade negotiations, so this is close to a revolutionary proposal (even if it is easy to argue 
that, in the long run, the EU has little choice but giving these up). The second EU 
proposal was to be more flexible on the so-called Singapore issues, which may mean 
abandoning them in the end, since most countries are not ready to launch multilateral 
negotiations on investment, competition and public procurement. Finally, the EU 
proposed to give a special deal to the 90 poorest countries in the world, which could 
benefit from freer access to world markets while not opening up further their own 
markets. In August 2004, the Doha Round participants adopted a package of temporary 
agreements including commitments, such as the abolition of agricultural export subsidies.  
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 Box 12.1:EU trade policy instruments 
Trade Policy Instruments 
The EU Commission, through DG Trade, also oversees the use of trade policy 
instruments, which are of the defensive and the proactive types.  
Defensive instruments: “Trade Defense Instruments” (TDI) may be used to 
counter unfair trade practices by other countries, in accordance with WTO agreements. 
They consist of: 
•  Anti-dumping measures: used to counter dumping, which occurs when 
manufacturers from a non-EU country sells goods in the EU below the 
sales price in their domestic market or below the cost of production –this 
is the most frequent trade-distorting practice. 
•  Anti-subsidy measures: used to combat subsidies, which help to reduce 
production costs from abroad or cut the price of EU exports, with the 
consequence of distorting trade. 
•  Safeguards: the WTO allows a country to restrict temporarily imports of a 
product if its domestic industry is seriously injured by a surge in imports. 
Proactive instruments: the “Trade Barriers Regulation” (TBR) enables 
companies to lodge a complaint with the EU Commission when they feel they encounter 
trade barriers that restrict their access to third country markets.  
Source: http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/respectrules/tpi_en/htm    32
 
Settling disputes in the WTO 
The WTO differs from its predecessor, the GATT, not only because it is a bona fide 
organization rather than a mere “agreement” with a broader scope, but also and perhaps 
most importantly due to its significantly strengthened dispute settlement mechanism, in 
which the EU has been an active participant. In 2004, the EU was involved in 29 WTO 
disputes as both a plaintiff (16 cases) and a defendant (13 cases) with 8 of its trading 
partners (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, Korea, Thailand and the US).24 In 
the majority of these cases (14 out of 29), the EU was paired against the US –11 times 
with the EU as the plaintiff (e.g. US Anti-Dumping Act and Foreign Sales Corporation) 
and only 3 times with the EU as the defendant (GMOs, hormones, and 
trademark/geographical indications). 
Such a high level of involvement has strengthened overall the power of the EU in 
trade. On one hand, some of the EU’s trade partners have exercised their rights to 
demand change in EU trade practices (such as on hormone-treated beef and bananas), 
which has resulted either in compliance or in the willingness by the EU to incur 
retaliatory sanctions. On the other hand, participation in the WTO has enabled the EU to 
confront other trade partners, in particular the US, on a variety of unilateral actions. The 
following examples of recent and ongoing transatlantic trade disputes are evidence of the 
power of the EU in the multilateral trade arena. 
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Steel: In the Spring 2002, the Bush administration unilaterally raised steel tariffs 
for a three-year period by 30% in order to protect its domestic steel industry from the 
problem of global overcapacity during a time of restructuring. The EU (and seven other 
countries25) launched a lawsuit at the WTO, which ruled that the tariffs were in violation 
of international trade rules. The WTO confirmed in November 2003 in its final ruling that 
the American tariffs are indeed illegal under international trade rules. Faced with threat 
that Europe would impose 100% duties on $2.2 billion worth of US imports, ranging 
from Harley Davidson to underwear to citrus juices from Florida-- products chosen 
mainly because coming from swing-states crucial for next year’s US presidential election 
– Washington dropped the tariffs in December 2003. 
Tax breaks: In 2000 the EU asked the WTO to adjudicate on the so-called 
Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) dispute, because this American law was believed to 
confer illegal export subsidies to many US companies by taxing exports more favorably 
than production abroad. In subsequent rulings, the WTO confirmed that the FSC indeed 
constituted an illegal export subsidy and gave the US administration until November 
2000 to withdraw its scheme. The US replaced the FSC law, but because the new law did 
not substantially modify the export subsidy scheme, the EU challenged it again in the 
WTO. In 2002 the WTO ruled again that these breaks were indeed an illegal subsidy and 
authorized the EU to impose $4 billion in retaliatory sanctions if the US law was not 
brought in compliance with WTO obligations. The Europeans, fearful of what the 
sanctions would do to their own economies given the size of the potential disruption to 
transatlantic trade (more than ten times larger than the beef and bananas sanctions 
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combined), opted for patience and instead gave the Americans ample time to change their 
tax laws. In March 2004 the EU began to gradually implement some retaliatory sanctions 
on American exports. The law repealing the FSC was finally passed in October 2004 and 
is supposed to be implemented as of 2005 (with a transitory period). The EU will lift the 
sanctions when the implementation of the new US law proves satisfactory.  
Anti-Dumping: In 2000 the WTO condemned the US 1916 Anti-Dumping Act 
for allowing sanctions against dumping not permitted under WTO agreements and gave 
the US one year to repeal the Act.. In February 2004, given the non-compliance of the 
US, the WTO allowed the EU to retaliate by implementing a mirror regulation that would 
be applicable only to American products. 
Genetically modified organisms: Since 1998, the EU has observed a moratorium 
on the approval of GMO products, and some member states banned the import and 
cultivation of some crops that had been approved prior to that date. The EU made this 
decision in response to popular concern about the long-term impact of GMOs on human 
health and the environment, although there was little scientific evidence to support these 
concerns, but no evidence either that GMOs are harmless (Pollack and Shaffer 2000; 
Vogel 2002; Rhinard 2004). This measure led to the suspension of exports of genetically 
modified corn from the US. The successive American administrations were hesitant at 
first to challenge at the WTO the issue of whether such public health concerns could 
legitimize protectionism. In May 2003, however, the Bush administration decided to 
finally file the suit against the EU at the WTO when it was learned that the EU warned 
Zambia to refuse US donations of genetically modified corn and that many poor African 
nations refused to experiment with GMO crops for fear that they could not sell them in   35
Europe. Such a lawsuit, however, is politically risky. It may spark a backlash from 
European consumers, already quite nervous over food safety in the wake of the mad cow 
and foot and mouth diseases, and perhaps some consumer resistance in the US as well.   36
“Open bilateralism”? The limits of transatlantic trade cooperation 
In spite of these disputes, the transatlantic trade partnership is characterized by a much 
greater degree of cooperation than conflict, owing to the unprecedented level of 
interdependence between the two sides of the Atlantic: in 2003 EU imports from the US 
represent a fifth of its imports while EU exports to the US represented a quarter of US 
exports.26 While transatlantic economic cooperation is not new, the post cold war era has 
been characterized by a much greater emphasis over economic and regulatory 
cooperation than ever before and the growing recognition by the US of the importance of 
the EU as an interlocutor over and above the member states (BP Chair Report, 2001). In 
the wake of the disputes surrounding the completion of the single market mentioned 
above the EU and the US signed a series of agreements to underpin their new 
transatlantic partnership – the Transatlantic Declaration (1990), the New Transatlantic 
Agenda (NTA, 1995), and the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP, 1998). The idea 
of a Transatlantic free trade area was quietly abandoned given its potential implications 
for agriculture, as well as grander schemes for the total elimination of all industrial 
tariffs. Instead, these agreements served both to increase the scope of cooperation 
(creating a “transatlantic marketplace”) and to introduce more formal institutions to 
manage such cooperation. Especially with the NTA, and at the urging of the Transatlantic 
Business Dialogue, a special focus was introduced on regulatory cooperation to allow the 
trading partners to overcome their non-tariff barriers to trade.  
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One of the most innovative aspects of the new transatlantic cooperation was the 
signing in 1997 of a series of “Mutual Recognition Agreements”, from pharmaceuticals 
to telecoms. These agreements were certainly less ambitious than their inspirators –the 
mutual recognition directives enforced to complete the internal market of the EU – in that 
they only covered the recognition of conformity assessments rather than recognition of 
the standards themselves (Nicolaidis and Egan 2001). But the difficulty of signing on to 
such agreements should not be under-estimated. US agencies like the Food and Drug 
Administration had to undergo a great deal of pressure before agreeing to transfer part of 
their regulatory authority to their EU counterparts. And accommodating the complex 
array of conformity assessment bodies operating in the US for electrical standards and the 
likes to the more coordinated system prevailing in the EU was no small feat. In fact it has 
proven impossible to extend the MRA approach beyond the original six to other products 
or to services where the US is notoriously plagued by regulatory fragmentation due to its 
federal structure.  
In fact the EU has successfully negotiated a whole array of MRAs around the 
world, spearheading a movement towards trade-friendly regulatory reform without 
deregulation. Whether its approach can serve as a laboratory for regulatory cooperation 
under WTO remains to be seen (Nicolaidis and Howse, 2002). 
The EU’s conditional support for Regionalism 
Last but not least, the EU has built over the last decade a complex web of preferential 
agreements which has come to encompass most of the planet. For several decades, the 
EU negotiated trade agreements only with its immediate neighbors (mainly to the East)   38
and the former colonies with which it shared historical ties, mainly through the 
successive Lomé (later Cotonou) conventions. Since the end of the Uruguay Round, 
which coincided with the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreements, the EU 
has become actively interested in negotiating regional agreements with a variety of other 
countries, mostly in Latin America, where the EU has signed “Global Agreements” 
(including free-trade) with Mexico in 2000 and Chile in 2002 (Sbragia 2004). An all-
encompassing agreement with the customs union Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay 
and Uruguay), aiming at the creation of a free-trade area with the European single 
market, is currently being negotiated. If concluded, this would be the first agreement 
between two customs unions. The EU has also signed regional association agreements 
through the 1995 Euro-Mediterranean partnership (also referred to as the “Barcelona 
Process”), with the goal of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area by 2010.27 
The EU has also negotiated a free trade agreement with South Africa in 2000. 
Box 12.2:The Barcelona Process 
The partnership between the EU and the Mediterranean countries is referred to as 
the ‘Barcelona Process’. In the 1995 Barcelona Declaration, the then 27 Euro-
Mediterranean Partners agreed on the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade 
Area by 2010, to be achieved through Association Agreements, negotiated and concluded 
with the European Union, together with free trade agreements between themselves. These 
association agreements also include respect for human rights and democratic principles as 
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essential elements. More recently it has been decided to add clauses on fighting 
Terrorism, and on Non proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.  
In addition to the EU member states, the parties to the Barcelona Process are: 
Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, 
Syria, Turkey, and Tunisia 
Source: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/regions/euromed/index_en.htm 
 
This active pursuit of regionalism through bilateral agreements further reinforces 
the EU as a global power. In part a forced reaction to the US’ move towards regionalism 
in the 1990s, the new policy has increased EU power by restoring a level playing field for 
European companies competing in the lucrative Latin American markets. Regionalism 
has also enhanced the EU’s normative power.  In a way, the EU has acted as a 
“globalizer” with Latin America, exporting its cultural and political dimensions along 
with its economic agreements (Sbragia 2004).  
 
Conclusion: The EU as a power in and through trade 
The EU is a formidable power in trade. If it is considered as one single economic unit, 
there is little doubt that it has become, after the last enlargement, the biggest trading 
block in the world. As a result its potential hegemonic power, based on the capacity to   40
grant or withhold access to its internal market, has become as strong as the US. 
Moreover, its more than forty years of experience negotiating international trade 
agreements on behalf of its members have made the EU an essential player and a 
powerful bargainer in the multilateral trading system.  
The EU is also becoming a power through trade. Increasingly, it uses market 
access as a bargaining chip to obtain changes in the domestic arena of its trading partners, 
from labor standards to development policies. Indeed, one of the central objectives of EU 
trade policy under the helm of trade commissioner Pascal Lamy has been to “harness 
globalization” and spread, through the negotiation of trade agreements, the European 
model of society to the rest of the world. One of the most interesting questions about 
European trade policy today is how far the EU will be willing or able to transform its 
structural power into effective influence and what will be its goals in establishing itself as 
a global power through trade. In particular, can the EU become an important foreign 
policy actor through the back door, by using trade instead of more traditional diplomatic 
or military means? As the 2004 bilateral agreement with Syria seems to indicate, the EU 
is now entering a new phase where it is increasingly ready and able to use its trade 
muscle to serve political goals, in this case controlling the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction. It remains to be seen, however, how effective such a policy will be in 
the long run, and whether the EU can escape the adjacent risk of (even benign) 
imperialism which comes from seeking to impose one’s model onto the rest of the world.  
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Further Reading 
The following is a selection of the very substantial literature about the EU’s trade 
policies, which reflects both the legal and the policy analysis aspects of the topic. 
Some historical background is provided by Devuyst (1995), Johnson (1998), 
Woolcock (1993) and Young (2000, 2002). The specific issues of competence and 
of the trade policy process (including WTO negotiations) are dealt with by 
Meunier (2000, 2005), Meunier and Nicolaidis (1999), Nicolaidis and Meunier 
(2002), Smith (2001) and Woolcock (2000). Smith (2001) and Young (2002) 
provide analysis of the ways in which the changing nature of world trade has been 
reflected in EU trade policies. 
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The first port of call for all matters of EU trade policy is the web site of EU Commission, 
DG Trade: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/ . Much useful information about the 
context for and the impact of EU trade policies can be obtained from the World Trade 
Organisation and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and development web sites: 
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good web site providing information and analysis about trade policies and the global   43
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http://www.iie.com/. 
 